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Facial Recognition · Discovery · Reliability · Case Analysis

State v. Miles

No. A-41-24 (N.J. June 24, 2026)

The New Jersey Supreme Court required meaningful discovery identifying the facial-recognition tools police used and explaining how they used them, while rejecting automatic disclosure of proprietary source code.

CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
Decision DateJune 24, 2026
OpinionJustice Fasciale; unanimous court
TechnologyFacial recognition technology
Primary IssueCriminal discovery and fair-trial rights
DispositionAffirmed as modified, reversed in part, and remanded

Executive Summary

Why this case matters

Miles rejects the idea that facial recognition is invisible to discovery merely because police characterize it as an investigative lead and do not intend to introduce the algorithmic result at trial.

Police investigating a Jersey City homicide used an Instagram profile image as a probe photograph in the NJ/NY HIDTA Facial Recognition Module. The system returned multiple possible candidates, including Tybear Miles. Investigators then obtained identifications from people who knew Miles, although no witness identified him as the shooter and no video captured the shooting.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the State must disclose non-proprietary information identifying the FRT tools and materials used and information showing how police used those tools in the investigation and prosecution. That information could bear on reliability, impeachment, investigative tunnel vision, and third-party guilt.

The court declined to require immediate disclosure of proprietary materials such as source code. Such discovery requires a developed, case-specific record and, after a showing that the material is confidential or proprietary, a demonstrated particularized need.

The Investigation

Police responded to a fatal shooting in Jersey City. A confidential informant who had not witnessed the shooting reviewed surveillance footage taken near the area shortly before the offense. The informant identified two people by street names and supplied their Instagram usernames.

Investigators downloaded an Instagram profile photograph associated with one of those individuals and used it as a JPEG probe image in a regional facial-recognition system. The FRT search returned Miles and several other possible candidates.

Police later interviewed Miles’s sister, former girlfriend, and other individuals who identified him in separate surveillance images. None identified him as the shooter, and the footage did not capture the shooting itself. Miles was indicted for murder and weapons offenses and sought FRT-related discovery.

Discovery Question

What facial-recognition information must prosecutors disclose when law enforcement used FRT during a criminal investigation, and when may a defendant obtain proprietary material such as source code?

Holding

The rule

Facial-recognition discovery is case specific and cannot be reduced to an automatic checklist. Here, the State was required to disclose information identifying the non-proprietary tools and materials used and information explaining how police used FRT. Compelled production of proprietary source code was premature because the record did not yet establish a particularized need.

The court affirmed the discovery order as modified, reversed the proprietary-disclosure portion without prejudice, and remanded for further proceedings.

Information Identifying the FRT Tools

The court held that basic identifying information would ordinarily be the minimum necessary to protect a meaningful defense. The required information may include:

  • The name and manufacturer of the FRT software.
  • The software version or versions used.
  • The years of development.
  • Key performance metrics.
  • Publicly available documentation concerning error rates.
  • The identity and nature of the database searched.
  • The operator who performed the search.

This information permits the parties and court to develop a record concerning the reliability and operation of the particular system actually used.

Information Showing How Police Used FRT

The State was also required to disclose how the technology affected the investigation. Relevant materials may include:

  • The original probe photograph.
  • Any edited, cropped, enhanced, or otherwise modified probe images.
  • The candidate photographs returned by the system.
  • The number and sequence of searches performed.
  • Candidate rankings, similarity information, and result lists.
  • Records showing how investigators selected Miles from multiple candidates.
  • Documentation of subsequent identification procedures and interviews.

The court identified three reasons this information mattered: it could impeach identification witnesses, permit a meaningful challenge to the investigation, and support evidence of third-party guilt.

Investigative use remains discoverable

The State’s decision not to offer an FRT result at trial did not make the technology irrelevant. When the tool helps identify or focus on a suspect, its operation can shape the entire investigative path.

Proprietary Information and Source Code

The court refused to apply the thirteen-item discovery order from State v. Arteaga mechanically to every case involving FRT. Proprietary discovery remains governed by the burden-shifting approach discussed in State v. Pickett.

StepRequired Showing
1. Protection claimThe party seeking to shield the material must establish good cause that it is confidential or proprietary.
2. Particularized needIf good cause is established, the defendant must demonstrate a case-specific need for the proprietary information sufficient to ensure a fair trial.
3. Tailored orderThe trial court evaluates relevance, necessity, burden, confidentiality, protective measures, and the specific defense theory.

Miles had not yet established that source code was necessary. The reliability record was incomplete, and defense counsel acknowledged uncertainty about whether source code would be useful. The reversal was without prejudice, allowing a renewed request on a more developed record.

What the Decision Does—and Does Not—Establish

Important limits
  • The decision does not establish a universal thirteen-item checklist for every FRT case.
  • It does require meaningful disclosure of basic tool-identification information and how the technology was used on these facts.
  • Calling FRT an investigative lead does not automatically remove it from discovery.
  • The decision does not require automatic production of source code or all proprietary documentation.
  • A defendant may renew a proprietary-discovery request after developing a particularized need.
  • The decision concerns discovery and fair-trial rights; it does not decide that the FRT identification was scientifically reliable or independently admissible.
  • The system generated possible candidates, not a conclusive identification of the offender.

Agency Guidance

1. Record the exact systemDocument the product, manufacturer, version, database, configuration, operator, and date of every search.
2. Preserve every probe imageRetain the original image and every cropped, enhanced, compressed, or edited version submitted to the system.
3. Preserve complete resultsKeep the entire candidate list, rankings, similarity information, timestamps, and audit logs—not only the selected candidate.
4. Document human reviewIdentify who reviewed the candidates, what criteria were used, and why investigators selected or rejected each lead.
5. Separate lead from identificationDo not describe an algorithmic candidate as a positive identification. Use independent investigative and identification procedures.
6. Prevent feedback contaminationAvoid exposing witnesses to FRT conclusions or candidate information before conducting properly documented identification procedures.
7. Notify prosecutors earlyDisclose that FRT was used even if the result will not be introduced at trial, so discovery and preservation obligations can be assessed.
8. Address vendor accessContracts should preserve agency access to documentation, audit information, performance materials, and evidence required for discovery.
9. Anticipate protective ordersWhen proprietary information may become relevant, coordinate with prosecutors and vendors rather than allowing confidentiality claims to delay litigation.
10. Train report writersReports should describe the search process accurately, identify corroboration, and avoid implying that FRT independently established identity or guilt.

Primary Sources and Further Reading

FRT discovery precedent: State v. Arteaga, 476 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 2023).
Proprietary software discovery: State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2021).
Related ShieldPST.ai analysis: State v. Loomis.