United States v. Riley
The Sixth Circuit decision applying United States v. Skinner to hold that approximately seven hours of real-time cellphone GPS tracking used to locate an armed-robbery fugitive at a motel was not a Fourth Amendment search.
Executive Summary
After a Michigan court issued an arrest warrant charging Montai Riley with armed robbery, investigators obtained the number of a new cellphone Riley purchased while on the run. A state court entered an order compelling AT&T to provide records and real-time GPS pings. Within hours, coordinates placed the phone at the Airport Inn in Memphis. The GPS data identified the motel but were not precise enough to identify a particular room. Deputies showed a photograph to the front-desk clerk, learned Riley had registered under an alias in Room 314, and arrested him after he opened the door. A firearm was visible on the bed. The Sixth Circuit held that approximately seven hours of tracking was not a Fourth Amendment search under United States v. Skinner because it revealed no more than Riley had exposed by traveling on public thoroughfares to the motel's public area. Judge Boggs separately proposed a broader alternative rule based on Riley's status as a fugitive subject to a valid arrest warrant.
This case is distinct from Riley v. California, which concerns searches of a phone's stored contents incident to arrest, and Florida v. Riley, which concerns helicopter observation of residential curtilage.
Key Holdings at a Glance
Armed Robbery, New Phone, and Interstate Flight
A Michigan court issued an arrest warrant on June 23, 2015, after finding probable cause that Riley had robbed a Check 'n Go store at gunpoint. Riley allegedly pointed a firearm at the clerk, directed her to open the safe, and fled with cash containers.
Two days later, Riley bought an AT&T cellphone. A family member gave the number to Riley's girlfriend so she could communicate with him while he was on the run. The girlfriend provided it to a member of the U.S. Marshals Service Grand Rapids Apprehension Team.
On June 26, investigators secured a state-court order and began receiving GPS coordinates. The data placed the phone at the Airport Inn in Memphis. Deputies confirmed Riley's presence through the clerk, who recognized his photograph and reported that he had checked in under the name “Rico Shawn Lavender.”
Deputies knocked on Room 314. Riley opened the door and attempted to close it; officers entered and arrested him. A Smith & Wesson .22-caliber pistol was in plain view on the bed, leading to a federal felon-in-possession charge.
The State Surveillance Order
The order invoked federal electronic-surveillance statutes, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 3123, and 3124. It authorized call metadata, cell-site data, and provider-initiated precision GPS location at intervals directed by investigators. On its face, authorization could continue for two months.
The parties agreed that the order was not a valid search warrant. The appellate issue therefore was whether the actual seven-hour GPS acquisition was a search requiring a warrant—not whether the order itself satisfied probable cause and particularity.
What “Pinging” Meant in Riley
The court carefully distinguished GPS data, cell-site information, and provider pings. GPS provides latitude and longitude coordinates derived through the device's satellite functionality. CSLI reflects network connections to cellular towers. A provider ping is an affirmative effort to identify the device's present location when it would not otherwise transmit that information.
The tracking at issue involved real-time GPS data. The record did not establish whether Riley's phone transmitted coordinates automatically or whether AT&T caused the device to generate them. That unresolved technical fact mattered to an electronic-trespass argument Riley attempted to raise at oral argument, but the court declined to consider it because it had not been preserved in the appellate briefing.
| Technical Question | Riley Record | Modern Documentation Need |
|---|---|---|
| Who initiated the location event? | Unclear whether automatic or provider-induced | Preserve provider workflow, signaling description, and request logs |
| What data were returned? | Latitude and longitude GPS coordinates | Identify fields, timestamps, accuracy, and confidence |
| How frequently? | Approximately every thirteen minutes on average | State authorized and actual update intervals |
| What precision? | Motel perimeter, not a specific room | Record error radius and whether protected spaces can be distinguished |
| How long? | Approximately seven hours before arrest | Define maximum duration and stopping events |
Application of United States v. Skinner
Skinner held that three days of cellphone-derived location tracking used to follow a drug courier on public highways was not a search. The Sixth Circuit treated Riley's case as an easier application: the tracking lasted hours, the target was already subject to an arrest warrant, and the coordinates supplied only a general destination exposed through public travel.
Riley argued that his phone may have been affirmatively manipulated rather than passively observed. Because he did not properly preserve the electronic-trespass theory, the court decided the case through the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework.
Why the Motel/Room Distinction Mattered
The first twenty-two coordinates clustered around the Airport Inn but could not reveal a specific room—even if the motel had been only one story. Deputies still needed ordinary investigative work to identify Riley within the building.
They went to the public lobby, showed the clerk a photograph, confirmed Riley's use of an alias, and obtained the room number. The court therefore characterized the GPS return as leading officers only as far as a public area, comparable to learning where a person ended a journey visible from public roads.
Karo, Kyllo, and Protected Interior Information
United States v. Karo held that monitoring a beeper to learn information about a container inside a home was a search. Kyllo v. United States held that technology not in general public use could not be deployed from outside a home to obtain interior details that otherwise would require physical intrusion.
The government acknowledged that greater precision identifying a particular home or motel room could present a different case. Because the GPS data did not supply that interior information, the panel did not resolve how Karo or Kyllo would govern a more precise ping.
The Existing Arrest Warrant
The panel's primary holding did not require a special fugitive rule. It found no search under Skinner. Riley's arrest-warrant status nevertheless strengthened the government's position and became central to Judge Boggs's concurrence.
An arrest warrant establishes probable cause to seize the named person. Under Payton v. New York, it may support entry into the suspect's own residence when officers have the legally required basis to believe the suspect is inside. Entry into a third party's residence generally presents additional concerns under Steagald v. United States.
Judge Boggs's Fugitive-Tracking Concurrence
Judge Boggs agreed with the panel's result but advanced a broader alternative rationale. He would have held that officers may track a fugitive's cellphone location—including potentially within a home—when a valid arrest warrant exists and officers reasonably suspect the fugitive possesses the tracked phone.
The concurrence drew from Payton, reasoning that an arrest warrant already interposes a judicial probable-cause determination between police and the individual. It also emphasized the limited purpose and duration of a manhunt, the non-content character of location data, and the user's choice to carry an operating phone.
Riley and Carpenter
Riley was decided one year before Carpenter v. United States. Carpenter held that acquiring the extended historical CSLI at issue was a search but expressly declined to decide real-time CSLI.
| Feature | United States v. Riley | Carpenter v. United States |
|---|---|---|
| Data | Real-time GPS coordinates | Historical CSLI |
| Duration | Approximately seven hours | 127 days obtained; Court addressed at least seven days |
| Purpose | Locate a named fugitive subject to arrest warrant | Reconstruct prior movements during robbery investigation |
| Precision | Identified motel, not room | Cell-site location record across time |
| Result | No search under Sixth Circuit precedent | Search; warrant generally required |
Carpenter's reasoning adds caution to modern reliance on older real-time cases, but its reservation means it did not expressly overrule Riley or Skinner.
Current Sixth Circuit Treatment
In United States v. Perry (2024), the Sixth Circuit cited Skinner and held that officers' use of real-time location data to find a person moving in public was not a search. That decision confirms the continuing importance of the circuit's public-location line.
In United States v. Mubarak (2025), the court declined to decide whether Carpenter permitted revisiting Skinner. Assuming four hours of real-time pinging was a search, it upheld the acquisition because ongoing bomb threats created exigent circumstances.
Practical Guidance for Investigators and Agencies
Real-Time GPS Warrant Checklist
- Identify the target, arrest warrant, underlying offense, and current fugitive status.
- Identify the phone number, account, provider, and available device identifiers.
- Provide facts connecting the phone to the target's current possession or control.
- Name the technique: provider-induced GPS ping, prospective CSLI, or another location service.
- Describe whether the device will be caused to generate information that does not already exist.
- Specify duration, update interval, maximum pings, precision, and stopping event.
- Address potential tracking into a home, hotel room, medical facility, or other sensitive place.
- Separate authorization for call records, historical location, and real-time location.
- Require provider records sufficient to authenticate and explain accuracy.
- Preserve an operational log and seek additional process before materially expanding the surveillance.
Fugitive Apprehension Checklist
- Confirm the arrest warrant remains valid and identify its offense and jurisdiction.
- Record facts establishing that the target is actively avoiding apprehension.
- Verify the target's connection to the tracked device using current information.
- Identify the governing law for phone-location acquisition in the operating jurisdiction.
- Use the narrowest effective location method and define when it must stop.
- Coordinate provider, prosecutor, court, supervisor, and apprehension-team requirements.
- Assess whether each return reveals a public place, target residence, third-party premises, or protected room.
- Identify the separate legal basis for any premises entry.
- Plan arrest tactics based on the offense, weapon information, occupants, and location.
- Preserve the complete timeline from number attribution through arrest and evidence recovery.
Litigation and Discovery Checklist
- Determine whether the return was GPS, CSLI, a provider-induced ping, or a hybrid.
- Establish whether the location data preexisted the request or were generated because of it.
- Identify every process used and the legal standard supporting each one.
- Reconstruct exact duration, number of pings, interval, precision, and location revealed.
- Examine whether the technology identified a building, room, home, or interior movement.
- Evaluate device attribution and whether the target actually possessed the phone.
- Separate the panel holding from Judge Boggs's broader concurrence.
- Analyze Carpenter and current circuit or state law without claiming it decided real-time GPS.
- Trace how the data led to the clerk interview, room identification, entry, arrest, plain-view observation, and seizure.
- Preserve provider communications, raw coordinates, maps, accuracy records, affidavits, orders, and officer logs.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did United States v. Riley hold?
The Sixth Circuit held that approximately seven hours of real-time GPS tracking used to locate an armed-robbery fugitive at a motel was not a Fourth Amendment search under United States v. Skinner.
Is this Riley v. California?
No. Riley v. California is the Supreme Court case requiring a warrant to search the digital contents of a phone seized incident to arrest.
Did the GPS data identify Riley's motel room?
No. It identified the Airport Inn but lacked sufficient precision to identify Room 314. The clerk supplied the alias and room number.
How long did officers track the phone?
Approximately seven hours before Riley's arrest, with location updates averaging about thirteen minutes apart.
Did officers have a search warrant for the tracking?
No. They had a state surveillance order, and the parties agreed it was not a valid search warrant.
Why was the arrest warrant important?
It established probable cause to arrest Riley and supported the concurrence's broader theory. The panel majority, however, relied on Skinner's public-location reasoning.
Did the court authorize tracking inside every home or motel room?
No. The panel stressed that the technology did not reveal Riley's specific room. The broader interior-tracking discussion appeared in a separate concurrence.
Did Carpenter overrule Riley?
Not expressly. Carpenter addressed historical CSLI and reserved real-time tracking. Later Sixth Circuit decisions continue to discuss the pre-Carpenter real-time cases.
Primary Authorities and Current Law
Sixth Circuit opinion holding that seven hours of real-time GPS tracking used to locate a fugitive at a motel was not a Fourth Amendment search.
Read United States v. Riley
Controlling Sixth Circuit precedent concerning short-term real-time cellphone location on public roads.
Read United States v. Skinner
Later Sixth Circuit opinion applying the circuit's real-time public-location precedent.
Read United States v. Perry
Sixth Circuit opinion reserving the broader real-time CSLI issue and applying exigent circumstances.
Read United States v. Mubarak
Supreme Court decision protecting extended historical CSLI while leaving real-time CSLI unresolved.
Read Carpenter
Final Assessment
United States v. Riley is a narrowly framed but operationally important location case. The GPS data did not expose a particular motel room or interior activity. It led officers to a building accessible to the public, and ordinary investigation supplied the protected-space detail.
The opinion also demonstrates the danger of collapsing distinct authorities. The arrest warrant authorized Riley's seizure; the surveillance order compelled provider data; Skinner supplied the majority's no-search rule; and separate principles governed entry and the firearm observed inside the room.